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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among 
the several States according to their respective 
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But 
when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and 
Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of 
the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the 
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one 
years of age, and citizens of the United States, 
or in any way abridged, except for participation 
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
iii 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or 
Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, 
civil or military, under the United States, or 
under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer 
of the United States, or as a member of any State 
legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution 
of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same or 
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But 
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each 
House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the 
United States, authorized by law, including debts 
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or 
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or 
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation 
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of 
this article. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-1-601 (1992) provides in pertinent part: 
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury, or a facsimile or representation of the 
item, and: 
(a) the actor1s use or apparent use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is 
in control of such an item. 
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Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-203 (1992) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated 
burglary if in attempting, committing, or fleeing 
from a burglary the actor or another participant 
in the crime: 
(a) causes bodily injury to any person 
who is not a participant in the crime; or 
(b) uses or threatens the immediate use 
of a dangerous weapon against any person who 
is not a participant in the crime; or 
(c) possesses or attempts to use any 
explosive or dangerous weapon. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-301 (1992) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the possession of 
another from his person, or immediate presence, 
against his will, accomplished by means of force 
or fear. 
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302 (1992) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon 
another. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Appellee/Respondent, : 
v. : 
PIERRE ADAMS, : Case No. 
Case No. 910437-CA 
Appellant/Petitioner. : Priority No. 13 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals fail to follow state and 
federal law when it determined that the eyewitness identification 
procedure used in this case did not violate the state or federal 
constitution? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals incorrectly decide an 
important question of statutory construction which should be decided 
by this Court when it determined that there was sufficient evidence 
to convict Petitioner of Aggravated Robbery even though the robber 
did not use an item to threaten the clerks? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Adams, 184 
Utah Adv. Rep. 72 (Utah App. 1992) (Case No. 910437-CA, filed 
April 9, 1992) is attached hereto as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTION 
On April 9, 1991, the Court of Appeals issued its opinion 
in this case. This Court granted Petitioner an extension of time in 
which to file this Petition for Writ of Certiorari up to and 
including June 8, 1992. 
This Court has jurisdiction to review this petition 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4 (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Pierre Adams filed a pretrial motion to suppress 
the identification testimony of two witnesses, claiming that the 
showup identification procedure violated due process under the state 
and federal constitutions. R. 53-4. After a hearing and argument 
held on October 23, 1990, prior to this Court's decision in State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the trial court denied the 
motion. R. 164. 
After the State presented its case, Mr. Adams moved to 
reduce the charge from aggravated robbery to simple robbery. 
R. 163:207-8. The trial court denied the motion. R. 163:208. 
Thereafter, a jury convicted Mr. Adams as charged. R. 50. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's rulings. Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 72. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of August 3, 1990, two clerks who were 
working in a fast food establishment in Salt Lake City were robbed. 
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R. 164:2; 163:7,8. When the robber entered the store, one of the 
clerks was pouring punch into the punch machine and the other clerk 
was talking on the telephone. R. 163:9,21; 164:3,7. 
The clerk who was talking on the telephone in a room which 
was adjacent to the counter continued talking throughout the 
robbery. R. 163:22,23; 164:7,66. She did not realize that a 
robbery had occurred until after it was over and the other clerk 
told her that she had been robbed. R. 163:23; 164:68. 
The clerk at the counter asked the man if she could help 
him. When he indicated that he had already been helped, she 
continued to pour punch. R. 163:9; 164:4. The man then asked the 
clerk if she had any money, and she responded that she did not. 
R. 163:10. The man then indicated that he wanted all the money in 
the store, and the clerk realized that she was being robbed. 
R. 163:11; 164:4. Immediately after the robbery, the clerk at the 
counter was distraught and crying. 
The man told the clerk at the counter to find out to whom 
the other clerk was talking or he would shoot her. R. 164:7-8. The 
clerk never saw a gun, but testified that the man touched his back 
pocket and said he had a gun. R. 164:8. Petitioner did not have a 
gun when he was arrested, and the officers searched the area and 
were unable to find a gun. R. 164:134,148. 
The robber was a black man whom neither clerk had seen 
before. Neither clerk was black. R. 163:9,17,; R. 164:4. 
After the robber left, the two women discussed his 
appearance and dress, and together they wrote down a description. 
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R. 163:26. Officers did not save this written description. 
Ten to twenty minutes after the robbery and about a half 
block away from the fast food restaurant, police arrested Mr. Adams 
after chasing him and taking him to the ground. They handcuffed him 
and placed him in a paddywagon. R. 163:27,48. 
Police transported the two clerks to the place where other 
officers had arrested Mr. Adams. R. 164:15. The officers told the 
clerks that they were holding someone nearby who they thought had 
committed the robbery. R. 164:46. 
Seated together in the back of the police car, the two 
clerks saw a disheveled and handcuffed black man being held up by 
two officers either next to or inside the police "paddy wagon". 
R. 164:75,47. Several police cars and officers were at the scene. 
R. 164:153,165. 
One clerk testified that the clothing the individual wore 
did not look like the clothing the robber wore. R. 164:46. She had 
testified at the preliminary hearing that she made the 
identification based on the clothing that the robber wore. 
R. 164:48. The clerks' descriptions of the clothing did not match 
the clothing worn by Mr. Adams when he was arrested. 
The clerks testified that the robber's hair was either 
short or long and curly but without braids. R.164:17,61-2,74,88. 
Officer Evans testified that Mr. Adams' hair was braided when he was 
arrested. R. 164:102-3,117. 
At a lineup, one clerk selected Mr. Adams but wrote his 
number on the back of the card, which indicated that she was not 
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sure. R. 164:92-4,97. The other clerk was not quite sure at the 
lineup. R. 164:54,57-8. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
THAT THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE DID 
NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS UNDER EITHER THE STATE OR 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION FAILS TO FOLLOW EXISTING LAW. 
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects 
an accused against the use of suggestive and unreliable eyewitness 
identification procedures. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 
184 (1968); Stovall v. Denno. 388 U.S. 293, 303 (1967); Neil v. 
Biggers. 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972). 
In Biggers, the Court outlined five factors to be 
considered in determining whether under the "totality of 
circumstances" the eyewitness identification procedure violated due 
process. Those factors are: 
[1] the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, [2] the 
witness' degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of 
the witness7 prior description of the criminal, 
[4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the 
witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length 
of time between the crime and the confrontation. 
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals set forth these 
factors and acknowledged that 
"The court must balance these five factors 
against the 'corruptive effect' of the 
identification procedures in order to determine 
whether the identification testimony should have 
been suppressed." 
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Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 73 quoting Archuleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 
709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting Mason v. Brathwaite. 432 U.S. 98f 
114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253 (1977). 
Although the Court of Appeals set forth the appropriate 
factors, it did not apply them properly to the facts in this case; 
nor did it take into account the "corruptive effect" of the 
procedure utilized. In addition, it inappropriately relied on a 
much criticized and arguably discarded factor—the certainty of the 
witnesses—in reaching its decision. See Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 73-4; State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 780-2 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, although both clerks arguably had an 
opportunity to look at the robber, the testimony demonstrated that 
neither clerk paid much attention to him. The prior description was 
compiled by both and therefore tainted each clerk's memory and was 
not accurate. The witnesses apparently were not certain at the 
lineup, and any "certainty" they felt developed as they had repeated 
opportunities to view Mr. Adams during the court proceedings. 
Although not much time elapsed between the robbery and the 
identification, the testimony revealed that the clerk who was at the 
counter was distraught and crying after the incident. 
In addition, the "corruptive effect" of the procedure 
utilized in this case outweighed any reliabilty that may have been 
demonstrated by the application of the Biggers factors. The 
procedure used in this case was unreliable and had a "corruptive 
effect" because (1) the two clerks worked together to come up with a 
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single description, thereby tainting each other's memory of the 
robber, (2) the two clerks sat together in the police car and 
together identified Mr. Adams as the robber, (3) no one other than 
Mr. Adams was present who could have been the robber, (4) Mr. Adams 
was held by police officers at or near the door of paddy wagon, 
(5) officers told the clerks that they thought they had the robber, 
and (6) Mr. Adams is black; neither of the clerks are the same race. 
Under the totality of the circumstances, the eyewitness 
identification procedure violated federal due process. 
The eyewitness identification procedure also violated state 
due process which is guaranteed by Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 779-784, this Court 
set forth a more stringent and updated analysis for determining 
whether an eyewitness identification procedure violates due process 
under the state constitution. 
The factors to be considered in determining whether the 
state constitution was violated are: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree 
of attention to the actor at the time of the 
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the 
event, including his or her physical and mental 
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification 
was made spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being 
observed and the likelihood that the witness 
would perceive, remember and relate it 
correctly. This last area includes such factors 
as whether the event was an ordinary one in the 
mind of the observer during the time it was 
observed, and whether the race of the actor was 
the same as the observer's. 
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Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781 quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493. 
Rather than analyzing these factors as they apply to the 
present case, the Court of Appeals focused on Ramirez and concluded 
that "[t]he facts of the present case present a more trustworthy 
procedure than did Ramirez." Adams, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. at 74. The 
only application of the facts in the present case was as follows. 
[B]oth women had a good opportunity to view the 
robber. Maestas,s attention, in particular, was 
focused on him throughout the event. The record 
indicates the women each remembered details of 
the man's clothing and both appear to be quite 
observant. The women's descriptions of the man 
to the police after the robbery, at the motion to 
suppress hearing and at trial are basically 
consistent. 
Id. 
This simplistic analysis miscontrues the evidence and 
disregards the fact that the clerks worked together in coming up 
with a description and in identifying Mr. Adams at the paddy wagon. 
This overwhelmingly prejudicial aspect of the identification 
procedure in the present case appears not to have been present in 
Ramirez. Id. at 776. 
The Court of Appeals failed to follow the dictates of 
Ramirez when it determined that Article I, Section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution was not violated in this case. 
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court grant a 
writ of certiorari on the issues of whether state or federal due 
process was violated by the eyewitness identification procedure 
utilized in this case. 
- 8 -
POINT II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY 
DECIDED AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT PETITIONER 
HAD COMMITTED AN AGGRAVATED ROBBERY EVEN THOUGH 
NO ITEM WAS USED IN THREATENING THE CLERKS. 
Neither clerk saw a gun or a facsimile thereof, and the 
officers did not recover a gun when they arrested Mr. Adams. 
R. 164:8,134,138. One clerk testified that the robber put his hand 
on a bulge in his back pocket and said "I don't want to have to 
shoot." R. 164:31,34. The robber also said that he would come back 
and shoot the clerk if she were to call the police. R.164:38. The 
man never said that he had a gun. R. 164:35,38. 
The issue presented in this case is whether the current 
version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302 affects this Court's holding in 
State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah 1987), and State v. 
Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989). 
In Suniville and Bruce, this Court held that an individual 
must use a firearm or a facsimile thereof in order to be convicted 
of an aggravated robbery.1 In Suniville, the teller testified that 
the defendant had his coat up over the counter and that "something 
was pointing at [her] in his pocket." Suniville, 741 P.2d at 962. 
The robber threatened to turn the incident into a homicide and to 
1. The robberies in Suniville and Bruce involved threats to shoot. 
The statute in effect at the time provides that: 
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing a robbery, he: 
(a) uses a firearm or facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon . . . . 
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"blast" anyone who tried to follow him. In Bruce, a man called and 
claimed to have a gun pointed at the clerk, then the defendant 
entered the store and pointed his pocket at the clerk. In each 
case, this Court held that there was insufficient evidence to 
sustain a conviction for aggravated robbery. 
In Suniville, this Court observed the "critical distinction 
between robbery and aggravated robbery where the evidence is only of 
verbal threats and intimidating gestures." In so doing, it 
prevented the "erosion" of distinction between the two crimes. 
Suniville, 741 P.2d at 965. 
The current version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 provides 
in relevant part: 
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; or . . . . 
Section 76-1-601 defines a dangerous weapon as: 
. . . any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury, or a facsimile or 
representation of the item, and: 
(a) the actor7s use or apparent use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably 
believe the item is likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) the actor represents to the victim 
verbally or in any other manner that he is 
in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 which defines simple robbery has 
not changed. 
- 10 -
Petitioner argued that § 76-1-601, when read together with 
§ 76-6-302, required that a robber use an item and not merely 
threaten to shoot in order to commit an aggravated robbery. 
In reaching its decision that threatening to shoot was 
sufficient to elevate the crime to aggravated robbery, the Court of 
Appeals relied on this Court's decision in State v. Hartman, 783 
P.2d 544 (Utah 1989). 
In Hartman, this Court held that an individual is guilty of 
an aggravated burglary where he verbally threatens the use of a 
dangerous weapon during the course of a burglary. Hartman is not 
dispositive of the issue in this case for two reasons: (1) the 
language of the aggravated burglary statute is different than that 
of the aggravated robbery statute, and (2) the distinction between a 
simple burglary where no one is confronted or no verbal threat to 
use a weapon is made is much greater than the distinction between a 
simple robbery and an aggravated robbery after the decision in Adams. 
All robberies involve direct contact between the victim and 
the robber, and threats and fear. Not all burglaries involve direct 
contact between the burglar and the dweller; those that do involve 
direct contact do not always involve threat or fear. While this 
Court's decision in Hartman preserved a distinction between burglary 
and aggravated burglary, the decision of the Court of Appeals eroded 
the distinction between robbery and simple robbery. 
Because this issue involves an important question of 
statutory construction, Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this 
Court grant a writ of certiorari on this issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
Petitioner Pierre Adams respectfully requests that this 
Court grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the issues set 
forth herein, 
SUBMITTED this fttL day of June, 1992. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 3 32 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this day of June, 1992. 
JOAN C. WATT 
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APPENDIX 1 
72 McPherson v. Belnap 184 Utah Adv Rep. 70 
CODE• CO 
Provo, Utah 
therefore, cannot be presumed negligent. He 
further argues that even if the presumption 
applies, the presumption was rebutted. 
When the bailment is for the mutual benefit 
of the bailor and the bailee, and the property 
cannot be accounted for, "a presumption of 
negligence is imposed on the bailee once the 
bailor proves the fact of bailment and damage 
to [or absence of] the bailed goods. The bailee 
must then come forward with evidence that 
the loss or damage was not due to the bailee's 
negligence." Staheli v. Farmers' Coop., 655 
P.2d 680, 682 (Utah 1982); accord Romney, 
111 P.2d at 546. The reason for the presum-
ption is the bailee, as the party in possession 
of the property, "is in a better position to 
control the conditions that may cause loss or 
damage and to know, or at least to be able to 
ascertain, the cause of any actual loss or 
damage." Staheli, 655 P.2d at 683; accord 
Sumsion v. Streator-Smith, Inc., 103 Utah 
44, 132 P.2d 680, 687 (1943). Therefore, for 
the presumption to apply, the bailee must be 
in exclusive possession of the property. Staheli, 
655P.2dat683. 
Vaughn Belnap argues his case is similar to 
Staheli, where the Utah Supreme Court 
refused to presume negligence because the 
bailee was not in exclusive possession of the 
property. See id. at 684. However, in Staheli, 
the plaintiffs and others, including transients, 
had unlimited access to the bailed property. Id. 
at 682. Therefore, the bailee did not have 
such control over the property so as to be in a 
better position than plaintiffs to determine or 
prevent the cause of the loss. Id. at 684. In the 
instant case, McPhersons did not have access 
to their property, nor were they in a position 
to prevent or determine the cause of the theft. 
We have already concluded that Vaughn 
Belnap had the right and the power to control 
McPhersons' property. He allowed Jeffrey 
Belnap to use the property, as permitted by 
the bailment agreement, but he remained res-
ponsible for its safety. A bailee cannot escape 
the presumption of negligence by electing to 
turn over the care of the property to another. 
Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly 
applied the negligence presumption to Vaughn 
Belnap. 
To rebut a presumption of negligence, a 
defendant must present some evidence of due 
care. Once a defendant presents evidence to 
prove due care, the presumption of law disa-
ppears, but an inference of negligence remains 
for the trier of fact to weigh along with the 
defendant's evidence. Wyatt v. Baughman, 
121 Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193, 195 (1951). The 
only evidence Vaughn Belnap presented to 
show due care was that there were normal 
locks on the doors, and Jeffrey Belnap reme-
mbered locking the doors because of an inci-
dent with his wife. The trial court character-
ized Jeffrey Belnap's testimony as to locking 
the doors as merely a self-serving statement. 
McPhersons showed that the investigating 
officer found no evidence of forcible entry, 
suggesting the circumstances were suspicious. 
After reviewing the evidence, we cannot con-
clude the trial court erred in finding Vaughn 
Belnap negligent. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude the trial court did not err in 
finding: (1) McPhersons and Vaughn Belnap 
entered a bailment agreement, (2) the bailment 
was for the mutual benefit of the parties, and 
(3) Vaughn Belnap was negligent in caring for 
the goods. We, therefore, affirm. 
Judith M. Billings Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Pierre Adams appeals his conv-
iction of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-302 (1990). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
At approximately 4:30 p.m. on August 3, 
1990, a man approached the drive-up 
window at the Taco Time restaurant on 1000 
West and North Temple in Salt Lake City, 
and ordered two tacos. He then told the clerk 
he had changed his mind and would come in 
the restaurant and order. Two young women, 
Robyn Maestas and Jennifer Green well, were 
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working at the restaurant at the time. Maestas 
was at the counter pouring punch when the 
man walked in. Greenwell, who had helped 
him at the drive-up window, was in the 
office talking to her father on the telephone. 
The office is approximately five feet from the 
counter and the office door was open. 
The man stood across the counter, about 
twelve inches from Maestas, and demanded all 
of the money in the store. Maestas opened the j 
cash registers and gave him the money. Still 
on the telephone, Greenwell was unaware the 
store was being robbed. The man repeatedly 
asked Maestas to whom Greenwell was talking 
on the telephone. He became upset and told 
Maestas that if she did not find out, he would 
shoot her. He also told her not to tell Green-
well about the robbery or call the police or he 
would come back and shoot her. Maestas 
never saw a gun but testified that the man 
touched a bulge in his pocket and said he had 
a gun. He remained in the restaurant a total 
of ten to fifteen minutes. When he left, he 
walked slowly south on 1000 West. Maestas 
and Greenwell immediately wrote down a 
description of the robber and Greenwell called 
the police. The police officers did not save the 
written description, however. 
Approximately ten to twenty minutes after 
Greenwell called the police, police officers 
arrested defendant about a half block away 
from the Taco Time. A police officer then 
took Maestas and Greenwell to identify defe-
ndant, whom they said fit the women's desc-
ription of the robber. Defendant was handc-
uffed and standing between two police officers 
in the doorway of a police van. Both women 
sat together in the back of the police car and 
identified defendant from a distance of about 
thirty feet. Defendant was arrested and 
charged with aggravated robbery. He did not 
have a gun when the officers arrested him. 
Before trial, defendant made a motion to 
suppress testimony regarding the eyewitness 
identification, claiming the procedure violated 
his due process rights. The trial court denied 
the motion. Following a jury trial, defendant 
was convicted of aggravated robbery. 
ISSUES 
Defendant appeals his conviction on the 
basis that the witness identification process 
was improper and that the aggravated robbery 
charge should have been reduced to simple 
robbery. 
WITNESS IDENTIFICATION 
The constitutionality of an identification 
procedure is a mixed question of law and fact. 
Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 598, 102 S. 
Ct. 1303, 1306 (1982). The trial court's con-
clusion that defendant's due process rights 
were not violated is reviewed de novo. Arch-
uleta v. Kerby, 864 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 
1989). The factual findings underlying the 
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conclusion are, however, entitled to a presu-
mption of correctness. Id. 
Defendant's motion to suppress the identi-
fication was based on both the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constit-
ution. However, at the hearing on the motion, 
defense counsel did not make separate argu-
ments under each constitutional provision or 
differentiate between them. 
Determining the constitutionality of an out-
of-court eyewitness identification procedure 
under the Federal Constitution involves a two-
step analysis. Archuleta, 864 F.2d at 711. 
First, the court must determine whether the 
identification procedure was unnecessarily 
suggestive so as to give rise to the possibility 
of irreparable misidentification. Neil v. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-200, 93 S. Ct. 
375, 381-82 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 
390 U.S. 377, 383-84, 88 S. Ct. 967, 970-
71 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 
302, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 1972 (1967). 
Second, the court must determine "whether 
under the totality of the circumstances, the 
identification was reliable." Biggers, 409 U.S. 
at 199, 93 S. Ct. at 382; see also Mason v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 
2253 (1977)(" reliability is the linchpin in det-
ermining the admissibility of identification 
testimony"). The Supreme Court set forth five 
factors to be considered when evaluating the 
reliability of an identification procedure: 
1. The opportunity of the witness to 
view the criminal at the time of the 
crime; 
2. The witness's degree of atten-
tion; 
3. The accuracy of the witness's 
prior description of the criminal; 
4. The level of certainty demonstr-
ated by the witness at the confron-
tation; and 
5. The length of time between the 
crime and the confrontation. 
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S. Ct. at 
382-83 (1972). "The court must balance these 
five factors against the 'corruptive effect' of 
the identification procedures in order to det-
ermine whether the identification testimony 
should have been suppressed." Archuleta, 864 
F.2d at 711 (quoting Mason, 432 U.S. at 114, 
97 S. Ct. at 2253); United States v. Thurston, 
771 F.2d 449, 453 (10th Cir. 1985). 
Applying the Biggers factors to the facts of 
this case, we find that the identification pro-
cedure was not unnecessarily suggestive. We 
also conclude that the procedure was reliable 
under the totality of the circumstances. The 
identification occurred a short time after the 
robbery took place. Both women had the 
opportunity to observe the robber. Greenwell 
observed him when he approached the drive-
up window. Maestas observed him from a 
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twelve inch distance for ten to fifteen minutes 
while he was robbing the restaurant. Maestas 
testified that she was looking "at him most of 
the time." immediately after the robber left, 
Greenwell and Maestas together wrote down a 
description of him. At the suppression 
hearing, Maestas testified that the man was 
black and was wearing a navy blue or black 
shirt that was open in the front and a baseball 
cap. She testified that Adams "had the same 
clothing on, and the same ball cap on, and 
everything," when she first identified him for 
the police. Both Greenwell's and Maestas's 
testimony at the suppression hearing and at 
trial indicate that they were certain Adams was 
the robber. We conclude that the eyewitness 
identification procedure did not violate defe-
ndant's due process rights under the Federal 
Constitution. 
This court has frequently stated we will not 
analyze issues under the Utah Constitution 
when the trial court did not have the opport-
unity to do so. "[T]he proper forum in which 
to commence thoughtful and probing analysis 
of state constitutional interpretation is before 
the trial court, not ... for the first time on 
appeal." State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 
(Utah A p p . 1990) (c i ta t ion o m i t t e d ) . 
"Nominally alluding to such different consti-
tutional guarantees without any analysis 
before the trial court does not sufficiently 
raise the issue to permit consideration by this 
court on appeal." State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 
326, 328 (Utah App. 1989) rev'd on other 
grounds (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 
799, 801 (Utah App. 1987)). 
We note, however, that in Stare v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme 
Court, applying the Utah Constitution, affi-
rmed the denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress an out-of-court eyewitness ident-
ification that was much less reliable than that 
in the instant case. In Ramirez, the defendant 
was convicted of aggravated robbery. The 
incident occurred out of doors at about 1:00 
a.m. Defendant was one of two robbers and 
wore a mask which covered most of his face. 
The eyewitness was one of the victims. He was 
held at gun point and had only a few minutes 
to observe defendant. When defendant arrived 
with the police to identify him, defendant was 
handcuffed to a chain link fence. He was the 
only suspect present and was surrounded by 
police officers. The eyewitness identified him 
from the back seat of the police car. The 
eyewitness was the only one of three victims 
who was able to identify defendant. The 
supreme court held that the eyewitness ident-
ification procedure did not violate defendant's 
due process rights under either the Utah or 
federal constitutions. Id. at 784. 
The facts of the present case present a more 
trustworthy procedure than did Ramirez. As 
discussed above, both women had a good 
opportunity to view the robber. Maestas's 
aggravated 
of commi-
to use a 
attention, in particular, was focused on him 
throughout the event. The record indicates the 
women each remembered details of the man's 
clothing and both appear to be quite obser-
vant. The women's descriptions of the man to 
the police after the robbery, at the motion to 
suppress hearing and at trial are basically 
consistent. We conclude that these facts con-
stitute a reliable identification under the Utah 
Constitution. 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CHARGE 
Defendant argues the trial court erred in 
failing to dismiss the aggravated robbery 
charge. He claims that because he was not in 
possession of a dangerous weapon during the 
robbery, he could only be charged with and 
convicted of simple robbery. The elements of 
aggravated robbery are codified in Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-6-302 (Supp. 1990) which 
reads in pertinent part: 
(1) A person commits 
robbery if in the course 
tting robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens 
dangerous weapon.... 
Simple robbery is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. section 76-6-301 (1990) as: 
[T]he unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property in the 
possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, 
against his will accomplished by 
means of force or fear. 
Defendant argues one must actually possess 
an item which is a dangerous weapon in order 
to be charged with and convicted of aggrav-
ated robbery. 
"The appropriate standard of review for a 
trial court's interpretation of statutory law is 
correction of error." State v. James, 819 P.2d 
781, 796 (Utah 1991); Stare v. Swapp, 808 
P.2d 115, 120 (Utah App. 1991). 
We find State v. Hartman, 783 P.2d 544 
(Utah 1989), dispositive of this issue. In Hart-
man, the supreme court held that threat-
ening to use a dangerous weapon while com-
mitting a burglary or an assault is sufficient to 
fit within the aggravated burglary or aggrav-
ated assault statutes respectively. "Use or 
display of such a weapon is not required; 
threat of such use is sufficient." Id. at 547. 
In enacting section 76-6-302, the legisla-
ture specified the crime of aggravated robbery 
included robberies during which the robber 
"uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
w e a p o n . " U t a h C o d e A n n . § 7 6 - 6 -
302(1 )(a). Threatening to use a dangerous 
weapon during the commission of a robbery, 
regardless of whether one actually possesses 
such a weapon, is sufficient for a charge of 
aggravated robbery under section 76-6-302. 
Such a construction reflects the legislative 
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intent in enacting the statute. See Hartman, 
783 P.2d at 547. 
In the instant case, defendant told Maestas 
that he would shoot her if she told Greenwell 
of the robbery, called the police, or if she did 
not find out to whom Greenwell was speaking 
on the phone. While he made these threats, he 
put his hand on his bulging pocket, leading 
Maestas to believe he had a gun and reason-
ably fear for her physical safety. It is not clear 
whether defendant actually had a gun at the 
time of the robbery, although he did not have 
a gun when he was arrested. Because defen-
dant threatened the use of deadly force, we 
conclude that the trial court did not err in 
failing to dismiss the aggravated robbery 
charge. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the 
eyewitness identification procedure did not 
violate defendant's due process rights under 
either the federal or Utah constitutions. We 
also conclude that the trial court did not err in 
failing to dismiss the aggravated robbery 
charge. Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
I CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This is an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment in a probate proceeding. The trial 
court held that appellee Phyllis Farrell 
(Phyllis) is the surviving spouse of Russell 
Farrell (Russell). Appellants, Russell's adult 
children from a previous marriage, claim the 
trial court erred. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Phyllis and Russell Farrell married April 22, 
1978. No children were born of the marriage, 
but both had children from previous marri-
ages. In early 1989, Phyllis and Russell sepa-
rated, and Phyllis filed a complaint for 
divorce on or about April 7, 1989. Russell 
signed a document entitled "Acceptance of 
Service, Appearance, Consent and Waiver" on 
April 8, 1989, stipulating to the entry of a 
default divorce. Russell then moved to Alaska 
and never returned to Utah. 
The default divorce was set for hearing in 
July 1989. Because Phyllis failed to appear, 
the hearing was rescheduled for August 21, 
1989. Russell died August 15, 1989 when the 
fishing vessel upon which he was employed 
capsized. Because neither Phyllis nor appell-
ants had been notified of Russell's death by 
August 21, 1989, the divorce hearing proce-
eded. After learning of Russell's death, 
Phyllis moved to have the divorce decree 
vacated nunc pro tunc. Her motion was 
granted October 2, 1989. 
Phyllis filed a "Petition for Determination 
of Heirs" in the probate proceedings for 
Russell's estate. By this petition, Phyllis 
sought a court order declaring her to be 
Russell's widow because she and Russell were 
married at the time of his death. Appellants 
objected to the petition, claiming Phyllis is not 
Russell's surviving spouse due to the divorce 
action. The trial court granted Phyllis's 
motion for summary judgment, determining 
that she is Russell's widow and an heir to his 
estate. 
On appeal, appellants contend the trial 
court committed reversible error because, 
pursuan t to Utah Code Ann. §75-2-
803(2)(a) (1978), a provision of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, Phyllis should not be 
considered Russell's surviving spouse. 
SURVIVING SPOUSE 
Appellants claim Phyllis is not Russell's 
surviving spouse because she filed a complaint 
for divorce before his death and had a decree 
of divorce entered after his death. The Utah 
Supreme Court addressed the effect of a 
party's death during a divorce proceeding in Da-
ly v. Daly, 533 P.2d 884 (Utah 1975). The 
court held that "when the death of one of the 
parties occurs after the entry of a divorce 
decree and before the decree is final the decree 
becomes ineffective." Id. at 885. In Nelson v. 
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